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A fully homomorphic encryption system hides data from unauthorized parties while still allowing them
to perform computations on the encrypted data. Aside from the straightforward benefit of allowing users to
delegate computations to a more powerful server without revealing their inputs, a fully homomorphic
cryptosystem can be used as a building block in the construction of a number of cryptographic
functionalities. Designing such a scheme remained an open problem until 2009, decades after the idea
was first conceived, and the past few years have seen the generalization of this functionality to the world of
quantum machines. Quantum schemes prior to the one implemented here were able to replicate some
features in particular use cases often associated with homomorphic encryption but lacked other crucial
properties, for example, relying on continual interaction to perform a computation or leaking information
about the encrypted data. We present the first experimental realization of a quantum fully homomorphic
encryption scheme. To demonstrate the versatility of a a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme,
we further present a toy two-party secure computation task enabled by our scheme.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevX.10.011038 Subject Areas: Optics, Quantum Physics,
Quantum Information
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Rivest et al. first imagined constructing a
cryptosystem with the property that a party without a valid
secret key required for decryption can nevertheless cor-
rectly evaluate a function f directly on a ciphertext x,
without learning anything about either fðxÞ or x [1]. In
addition to the obvious benefit of being able to delegate
computation to a party that is otherwise not trusted with
private data, cryptographers have observed that elegant
cryptographic solutions to particularly interesting tasks can
be constructed on top of a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme—secure multiparty computation, noninteractive
zero-knowledge proofs, and one-time programs, to name
a few [2–6]. Despite the apparent utility of such an
encryption scheme, the question of whether it was possible
to efficiently construct one remained open until 2009 when
the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme was
constructed for classical machines [7].
In quantum computing, a range of works have studied the
closely related problems of secure delegated quantum
computing (SDQC) [8–14] wherein Alice may securely
delegate a computational task to Bob (who may have a more
powerful quantum computer) without revealing her data.
But while SDQC is one prominent use case for FHE, it does
not itself enable the wider gamut of cryptographic appli-
cations that a true FHE scheme is capable of. In existing
SDQC schemes, Alice and Bob must be allowed to interact
repeatedly as they collaborate to perform a computation.
The interactions often require either that Alice be cognizant
of operation(s) performed by Bob or that Bob foregoes the
freedom to choose which computation to perform. These
constraints make SDQC ill suited for certain applications of
FHE (for example, secure multiparty computation) where
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both Alice and Bob must simultaneously be afforded
autonomy and privacy—each must be allowed to implement
a computation of their choice while keeping private portions
of their computation from each other.
Construction of a quantum fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (QFHE) scheme was explored more recently. Early
QFHE proposals treated the problem in an information-
theoretic setting—that is, the resulting encryption scheme
must produce ciphertext that is uncrackable even given
unlimited computational power. Schemes that were
proposed under this model [15,16], and subsequently
demonstrated experimentally [17], leaked some explicit
information about the plaintext, and are therefore unac-
ceptable under mainstream notions of security. More recent
efforts relaxed the information-theoretic setting to one with
computational assumptions, at first for circuits of shallow T
depth (number of T gates sequentially applied) [18] and
subsequently extended for circuits of arbitrary depth [19],
yielding the first construction of a true QFHE scheme.
Later this was improved to allow QFHE with a classical
client [20].
It must be noted that cryptographic security with compu-
tational assumptions is standard in classical encryption
schemes (including FHE ones), where security hinges on
the assumeddifficulty of computing particular problems like
prime factorization of large integers (which is now known to
be efficiently solvablewith a quantum computer) or learning
with errors (essentially a Gaussian inversion problem with
noise, for which an efficient algorithm is not known even for
quantum computers). So-called “postquantum” crypto-
graphic schemes, including many classical FHE ones, are
built atop problems like learning with errors. In turn, these
“quantum-safe” classical FHE schemes are used to endow
correspondingQFHE schemeswith the necessary properties
(see, e.g., Refs. [18,19], which we discuss below), as well as
to construct cryptographic schemes for a variety of different
settings (for example, when the input or encrypter is entirely
classical [20]).
In this work, we implement and experimentally demon-
strate for the first time the quantum homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme proposed by Broadbent and Jeffery [18]. This
scheme was extended in Dulek et al. to a quantum fully
homomorphic encryption scheme, applicable to circuits of
arbitrary T depth, but is beyond the reach of current
experimental techniques [19]. However, for shallow T
depth circuits, the scheme of Broadbent and Jeffery
suffices. For a small-scale proof-of-concept implementa-
tion, ours exhibits all the necessary attributes for a QFHE
scheme and clearly illustrates its important operational
features in a fully quantum setting. To illustrate the
versatility of QFHE over SDQC, we demonstrated a toy
problem in which two parties wish to securely compare
their quantum states (which precludes, e.g., the scheme
in Ref. [20]), which is easily accomplished in our con-
struction. Various two- and three-qubit circuits in these
demonstrations are implemented optically in a four-photon
setup, with each qubit encoded in photon polarization and
one photon serving as herald.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Sec. II, we place this work on a solid theoretical footing by
first outlining the basic requirements of a QFHE scheme
(Sec. II A) and then describing in detail the construction of
the QFHE scheme we implemented in this work (Sec. II B).
Section III describes our experimental apparatus and then
proceeds to discuss data showing the core QFHE scheme at
work. Finally, Sec. IV details the toy two-party computa-
tion task and discusses the experimental setup and data
pertaining to it.
II. THEORY BACKGROUND
A. Basics of a homomorphic cryptosystem
Ahomomorphic encryption schemederives its name from
the fact that operationally it behaves like a ring homomor-
phism between plaintext and ciphertext (we call these ϕ and
ψ , respectively)—even though, in practice, the encryption-
decryption procedures are not constructed as homomor-
phisms per se. Loosely speaking, one constructs a FHE
scheme such that for every valid operation on plaintexts (say,
multiplication or addition) there is a well-defined operation
on the corresponding ciphertexts, such that the output
decrypts back to the correct intended plaintext.
In an idealized quantum setting where ϕ and ψ are
quantum states, this might be written as DskðU0EpkjϕiÞ ¼
DskðU0jψiÞ ¼ Ujϕi, where Epk and Dsk are encryption-
decryption procedures (with keys pk and sk) Alice uses to
hide jϕi from Bob, U is some desired transformation on
plaintext ϕ, and U0 is a computation on ciphertext jψi
performed by Bob to effect that desired transformation U.
In practice, whereas U are unitary operations that act on
jϕi only, U0 can be supplanted by more complicated
operations—for instance, ones that act on both jψi along
with ancillary quantum as well as classical resources. This
more general operation is also called the “evaluation map”
(Eval), and all ancillary resources required by Bob to
execute the evaluation map are called the “evaluation key,”
which may be a combination of classical (ζ) and quantum
(jξi) bits. Generally then, for every valid Ujϕi, we want a
corresponding evaluation map such that the output decrypts
back to Ujϕi:
DskfEvalðU; jψi; jξi; ζÞg
¼ DskfU0ðjψi ⊗ jξiÞ; fðζÞg
¼ Ujϕi: ð1Þ
Some subtle but important points worth stressing are that
a QFHE scheme must be constructed so that any party (say,
Bob) in possession of ciphertext jψi must be able to
transform it by their choice of an arbitrary evaluation
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map that corresponds to the correct operation on the
underlying jϕi without interacting with Alice beyond the
initial exchange of ciphertext. Therefore, any attendant
resource(s) (i.e., the evaluation key) required by Bob to
do so must be generated by Alice at the same time as the
secret key, and transmitted to him alongside jψi. In SDQC
applications, by contrast, this restriction becomes less
important, since through interactions during the computation
Bob can request these resources and Alice can supply them
as and when they become necessary. Furthermore, a QFHE
scheme must be compact. That is to say, the encryption and
decryption operations must be easily computed even when
U becomes increasingly complex. Otherwise a trivialQFHE
solution exists where Bob, instead of manipulating jψi
himself, simply returns a list of instructions that Alice must
perform as part of her decoding operation.
The scheme that we experimentally implement in this
work, which closely follows Broadbent and Jeffery [18],
satisfies both noninteractivity and compactness as long as
there is only a small, fixed number of T gates (defined
below) within the quantum circuit that definesU. In Sec. II
B, we describe our handling of T gates and the origins of
this restriction, along with comparisons to relevant previous
works. The astute reader will recognize difficulties with T
gates in the quantum setting as being somewhat analogous
to the case of multiplication operations in classical homo-
morphic schemes, that were subsequently resolved in
Ref. [7]. In the quantum setting, restrictions on the number
of T gates were removed by Dulek et al., but experimental
implementation of that scheme is beyond reach at
present [19].
B. QFHE scheme
The workhorse of our encryption scheme is the Pauli
mixing operation Ea⃗;b⃗jϕi ¼ Za⃗Xb⃗jϕi. Here, jϕi is an
arbitrary n-qubit plaintext state, a⃗; b⃗ ∈ f0; 1gn are two
classical n bit strings, and Z and X are standard Pauli
operators. The notation Za⃗Xb⃗ is to be interpreted as
⊗k ZakXbk ¼ ðZa1Xb1Þ ⊗    ⊗ ðZanXbnÞ. If a⃗ and b⃗ are
randomly selected from a uniform distribution on each use
or shot, then they serve as single-use encryption keys or
one-time pads. To an eavesdropper with no access to a⃗ and
b⃗, the resulting state appears to have been drawn from the
fully mixed or random state that bears no resemblance to
the original plaintext jϕi [21]:
X
a⃗;b⃗
1
22n
Za⃗Xb⃗jϕihϕjZa⃗Xb⃗ ¼ In=2n; ð2Þ
where In is the 2n × 2n identity matrix.
This approach has a desirable property in relation to
Clifford gates (i.e., unitary operators generated by the set
fX; Y; Z;H;CNOTg; see Fig. 1 for definitions). Invariance
of the Pauli group under conjugation by Clifford operators
means that decrypting a ciphertext that had been modified
by a Clifford gate requires only Pauli gates. Suppose Alice
prepares quantum ciphertext jψi ¼ Ea⃗;b⃗jϕi ¼ Za⃗Xb⃗jϕi and
sends it to Bob who acts on it with a unitary U before
returning it to Alice (we momentarily drop the prime in U0
that distinguishes between ciphertext and plaintext quan-
tum operations—for Clifford gates, they are the same). If
U ¼ Uc is a Clifford gate, then Alice decodes the result
simply by applying another pair of Pauli operators:
Da⃗0;b⃗0 ðUcjψiÞ ¼ Da⃗0;b⃗0 ðUcZa⃗Xb⃗jϕiÞ
¼ Za⃗0Xb⃗0UcZa⃗Xb⃗jϕi
¼ Ucjϕi; ð3Þ
where a⃗0 and b⃗0 are decryption keys (see Fig. 1).
Pauli mixing had previously been discussed and used in
SDQC schemes [8,14,21]. In this work, as in Broadbent
and Jeffery [18], we introduce the following important
additions to elevate it to a homomorphic scheme. As she
prepares jψi, Alice also prepares and sends to Bob as
follows.
(1) Addition no. 1. Her Pauli keys ða⃗; b⃗Þ, encrypted with
a classical homomorphic encryption scheme (call
this Enc). Bob modifies Encða⃗; b⃗Þ appropriately as
he performs his computation on jψi.
(2) Addition no. 2. Ancillary qubits jξi that depend only
on her Pauli keys ða⃗; b⃗Þ. In performing his compu-
tation on jψi, these ancillary qubits are either
FIG. 1. Key transformation under Clifford gates. In circuit
diagrams above, ZaXb and Za
0
Xb
0
are encrypting and decrypting
maps performed by Alice. The symbol ⊕ denotes addition
modulo 2.
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consumed or discarded, as necessitated by Bob’s
evaluation map.
It is important to emphasize that the additional resources jξi
and Encða⃗; b⃗Þ are prepared by Alice in a front-loaded
fashion, at the same time as jψi, and transmitted to Bob all
at once so that further interactions between Bob and Alice
will not be necessary. Below we elaborate on the purpose of
these additional resources.
1. Addition no. 1
Notice, from Eq. (3) and Fig. 1, that decryption keys
ða⃗0; b⃗0Þ are determined both by the encryption keys ða⃗; b⃗Þ
(which only Alice knows) and U (which Bob performs). In
a SDQC setting where Alice knows ahead of time which
operation(s) Bob performs or otherwise learns about it as
they interact during the computation, this is not a problem
(cf. Refs. [8,14]). In a QFHE setting where Alice does not
a priori know Bob’s choice of operation(s), we must
engineer a means for her to acquire them at the end of
Bob’s computation.
In making addition no. 1, we are leveraging the existence
of a classical FHE [7,22] scheme to allow Bob to modify
Alice’s decryption keys as necessary so that they remain
valid regardless of his choice of operation(s). Since Enc is
chosen to be homomorphic, Bob can transform an encrypted
representation of Alice’s Pauli encryption keys, Encða⃗; b⃗Þ,
to the corresponding decryption keys, Encða⃗0; b⃗0Þ, without
actually knowing what those keys are. When the computa-
tion is done,Bob returnsEncða⃗0; b⃗0Þ toAlice,whodecrypts it
to obtain ða⃗0; b⃗0Þ, whereupon she can decrypt U0jψi. The
necessary transformation(s) from Encða⃗; b⃗Þ→ Encða⃗0; b⃗0Þ
are enumerated in Fig. 1 (if Bob chooses to perform a
Clifford gate) and Fig. 2 (if he performs a non-Clifford T
gate; we discuss this case in the next section). Since in a
QFHE setting adversaries are assumed to have quantum
computing capabilities, it is important for us to note that our
choice of Enc, an existing classical FHE scheme based on
the learning-with-errors problem, iswidely believed (though
not proven) to be secure even against such a quantum-
capable adversary [23].
2. Addition no. 2
In addition to Clifford gates, a universal quantum
computer must be complemented by at least one non-
Clifford element [24]. A standard choice that we use in this
work is the T gate (T ¼ j0ih0j þ eiπ=4j1ih1j). Unlike
Clifford operators, unfortunately, the T gate does not
generally preserve the Pauli group by conjugation.
Therefore, Bob’s operating on Alice’s ciphertext with a
T gate may introduce an erroneous phase that must be
corrected:
Tjψi ¼ TðZaXbjϕiÞ
¼ PbZaXbðTjϕiÞ ð4Þ
(for convenience of exposition, we drop the vector notation
on a and b in the remainder of this section, momentarily
focusing instead on the case of single-qubit plaintexts).
Since the desired plaintext operation is Tjϕi, the term Pb
that appears in the last line is extraneous and must be
undone before further gates in the computation are per-
formed or decryption is done (by Pauli gates as before).
Effecting the necessary correction P†b without divulging
b, part of Alice’s encryption keys, to Bob (thereby com-
promising the encryption) had also been a central challenge
in other works. In an early SDQC scheme [8], each time a
T gate is performed, two rounds of quantum communica-
tion are necessary, during which Alice can decide (on Bob’s
behalf) whether or not a P gate is applied. In an improved
scheme [14], the additional rounds of quantum interaction
can be reduced with Alice preparing the ancillary qubit
ZrPbjþi ¼ 1ffiffi
2
p ðj0i þ eið2rþbÞπ=2j1iÞ and Bob teleporting it
onto jψiwith the circuit in Fig. 3 (see the Appendix C for a
FIG. 2. The ancilla qubit(s) usage in three canonical cases for
single-qubit Clifford sequences followed by a T gate. By a0 and b0
we denote the result of transforming decryption keys a and b in
accordance with Fig. 1 for every Clifford operation that precedes
the T gate (which here are the gate sequences T, TH, and THP).
Here, r; s ∈ f0; 1g are random bits that secure jξai and jξbi,
respectively.
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derivation of the action of this circuit). Here,
jþi ¼ 1ffiffi
2
p ðj0i þ j1iÞ, r ∈ f0; 1g is a random bit, and b is
Alice’s Pauli X key. Yet another variation replaces jξi in
Fig. 3 with ZrPdjþi, where d is another random bit, which
can be produced at the outset and supplements it with the
classical bit b ⊕ d as needed [14].
Still, both SDQC schemes just discussed are interactive.
As we have seen, any operation(s) performed by Bob on
jψi potentially causes the Pauli decryption keys to change.
So if a T gate is preceded by other gates, the effective Pauli
key b0 that determines whether a P† correction is required
generally differs from Alice’s original Pauli encryption key
b and is not known to her a priori. Therefore, she is only
able to prepare the appropriate ancillary resources that Bob
needs (jξi ¼ ZrPbjþi or classical bit b ⊕ d) after learning
about those other gates through a midcomputation round of
interaction. The need for this kind of interaction, as
previously discussed, is unacceptable for QFHE.
In this work (following Broadbent and Jeffery [18]), by
anticipating the set of possible phase corrections, we can
front-load preparation of ancillary qubits jξi so that Bob’s
handling of T-gate evaluations can be noninteractive.
Consider an arbitrary Clifford circuit followed by a single
T gate. Observe from Fig. 1 that any sequence of single-
qubit Clifford gates can transform the Pauli X key in only
three distinct ways: either it remains unchanged (b0 ¼ b) or
it is swapped or added with the Pauli Z key (i.e., b0 ¼ a or
b0 ¼ a ⊕ b). When a two-qubit Clifford gate (say, a CNOT)
is added into the mix in an N-qubit circuit, the set of
possible effective b0 on the nth qubit can only be composed
of sums (modulo 2) of all the Pauli keys:
b0n ¼
X
j∈An
aj þ
X
k∈Bn
bk

mod 2; ð5Þ
where An, Bn ⊆ f1; 2;…; Ng depend on the Clifford circuit
in question.
A key enabler of our scheme is the circuit shown in Fig. 4
(see Appendix C for details on the operation of this circuit).
Even though there are altogether 22N possible values for b0n
in this case, Alice need only prepare 2N ancillary qubits of
the form jξaji ¼ ZrPaj jþi and jξbki ¼ ZsPbk jþi. Here,
r; s ∈ f0; 1g are random bits that are meant to secure jξaji
and jξbki. By selectively applying that circuit on some of
these 2N ancillary qubits, Bob can synthesize an appro-
priate qubit for any one of 22N possible b0n that takes the
additive form of Eq. (5). Crucially, aj and bk are Alice’s
initial Pauli keys, not the decryption keys that are modified
by any of Bob’s operations. They are therefore known to
Alice ahead of time, allowing her to front-load their
preparation and avoid subsequent interactions with Bob.
For theN ¼ 1 case, we summarize in Fig. 2 how Bob might
handle the phase correction for each of three possible
FIG. 3. Securely applying a P†b phase correction with aid of an
appropriate ancilla. Since r is a random bit, Bob (represented by
dashed box) remains ignorant of Alice’s key b.
FIG. 4. Circuit to combine ancillary qubits ZrPaj jþi and
ZsPbk jþi produces a new ancillary qubit ZqPa⊕bjþi. This
way, Bob can generate any one of 22N possible ancillary qubits
whose phase takes the form of sums (modulo 2) of Alice’s Pauli
keys aj and bk.
Algorithm 1. QFHE: Summary of protocol.
Alice:
1. Generate random keys and prepare ancillas.
(a) Generate Pauli keys a⃗; b⃗ ∈ f0; 1gN .
(b) Generate keys pk and sk for Enc (a classical FHE
scheme); call “keygen()” in HElib (see Refs. [22,25]).
(c) Prepare sufficient set of ancillas fjξig for anticipated T
depth. For T depth 1, these are jξaji ¼ ZrjPaj jþi and
jξbki ¼ ZskPbk jþi for each j; k ∈ f1; 2;…; Ng, and
rj, sk ∈ f0; 1g are random bits. For greater T depths,
ancillas with phases multiplicative in ak and bk must
be anticipated and prepared (cf. Fig. 2).
2. Encrypt:
(a) Encrypt quantum plaintext (jϕi): jψi ¼ Za⃗Xb⃗jϕi.
(b) Encrypt Pauli keys: ða⃗; b⃗Þ → Encpkða⃗; b⃗Þ.
3. Send jψi, fjξig, Encpkða⃗; b⃗Þ, and pk to Bob.
Bob:
For each intended gate, Ul ∈ fU1; U2;…; ULg:
1. Apply the gate: jψi → Uljψi.
2. If Ul ¼ T (i.e., is non-Clifford):
(a) Based on all preceding operations fU1; U2;…; Ul−1g,
generate ancilla jξ0i through repeated use of circuit in
Fig. 4 on fjξig.
(b) Apply phase correction on jψi with circuit in Fig. 3
and jξ0i.
3. Homomorphically update Pauli keys:
Encpkða⃗; b⃗Þ⟶
U1 Encpkða⃗0; b⃗0Þ⟶
U2 Encpkða⃗00; b⃗00Þ   
If Ul is Clifford, update rules are shown in Fig. 1. If Ul ¼ T,
they are shown in Fig. 2 for T depth 1 circuits. Update rules
for greater T depth circuits can be inferred from those.
4. Return jψi and final set of Pauli keys Encpkða⃗00; b⃗00Þ.
Alice:
1. Decrypt Pauli keys: Encpkða⃗00; b⃗00Þ → ða⃗00; b⃗00Þ.
2. Decrypt jψi: Za⃗00Xb⃗00 jψi ¼ UL…U3U2U1jϕi.
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values of b0 (which correspond to the gate sequences T,
TH, and THP) with just two ancillary qubits from Alice.
Thus far, we have only discussed our QFHE scheme in
the context of pure Clifford circuits followed by a lone T
gate. The case of circuits with greater T depth (i.e., number
of layers of T gates sequentially applied) is more compli-
cated. After a T gate had been applied, multiplicative terms
in the updated Pauli keys (see Fig. 2) can appear and b0 may
no longer take the form of Eq. (5). If Bob subsequently
performs another T gate, he may no longer be able to
synthesize the correct state to perform post-T-gate phase
corrections from just the 2N ancillary qubits discussed
above. If the T depth of Bob’s intended circuit is bounded
ahead of time, Alice can still anticipate all possible phase
corrections and prepare the necessary minimal set of
ancillas that Bob may need. However, the number of
possibilities grows doubly exponentially quickly with T
depth, making our scheme unsuitable for deep circuits. A
clever trick by Dulek et al. gets around this limitation, but its
experimental implementation is currently out of reach [19].
For the purposes of our proof-of-principle experimental
implementation, we content ourselves with a demonstration
of the smallest nontrivial case—that of a Clifford sequence
and a single T gate, on three qubits (one data or plaintext
and two ancillary qubits). We believe that this sufficiently
illustrates the main mechanisms by which our QFHE
scheme operates. Algorithm 1 and Fig. 5 summarize the
full QFHE scheme being implemented.
III. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION
We implemented the core QFHE protocol described
above in Sec. II B in an optical setup. Our implementation
accommodates a total of three (1 data and 2 ancilla) logical
qubits and is capable of performing arbitrary single-qubit
rotations, but is limited to a single two-qubit gate per pair of
qubits and to circuits of T depth one (i.e., no cascaded T
gates). These latter restrictions are simply due to the limited
scale of the specific setup we constructed in our laboratory,
and do not imply any fundamental limitation of the protocol
in general.
Qubits in our implementation are encoded in the polari-
zation degree of freedom (d.o.f.) of photons. Single-qubit
gates are realized using standard birefringent polarization
optics. Two-qubit gates, specifically controlled-X (CNOT)
and controlled-Z gates, are implemented postselectively by
leveraging bosonic bunching or the Hong-Ou-Mandel
(HOM) effect [26–29]. Figure 6 shows a schematic of
our optical apparatus. The apparatus is discussed in further
detail in Sec. III B.
Photons in our experiment are produced in a type-I
spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) source.
The source is a 2-mm-thick BBO crystal pumped with 404-
nm blue light in a double-pass configuration (the blue pump
is retroreflected to pass through the BBO crystal a second
time, so that SPDC can occur on both the forward and
reverse passes). Down-converted 808-nm photons are
collected at an opening angle of 3° on both passes (see
Fig. 7). The 404-nm SPDC pump is generated via second
harmonic generation, which is itself pumped with a
Ti:sapphire laser (Coherent Chameleon Ultra) configured
to pulse with a repetition rate of 80MHz, center wavelength
FIG. 5. Diagram of our QFHE scheme. (a) The intended
computation U performed by Bob directly on plaintext jϕi.
(b) The same computation U performed via QFHE. Here E andD
are encryption and decryption operations. The computational
map performed by Bob is a quantum channel that depends on the
intended computation on U, and consumes some ancillas jξi in
the process. Classically homomorphically encrypted Pauli keys
Encða⃗; b⃗Þ are modified along the way. Alice decrypts Encða⃗; b⃗Þ,
which allows her to decrypt jψi and obtain the desired
output Ujϕi.
FIG. 6. Schematic of optical circuit designed to implement each
canonical case enumerated in Fig. 2. Each incoming rail from the
left is a separate photon from a SPDC event (see Fig. 7 for source
schematic). Liquid-crystal retarders allow us to modulate the
phase of a qubit much more quickly and precisely than a
motorized wave plate mount. Two-qubit gates shown here in
dashed boxes can be bypassed as necessary, either by swapping a
photon onto another rail (gray dashed lines) or by translating
“CNOT 1” out of the optical path.
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of 808 nm, and transform-limited pulse duration of 150 fs.
During use, photons from this source are spectrally narrow
band filtered (3 nm FWHM, Edmund Optics). When power
for the blue (404 nm) pump is set to average at 10 mW,
the source produces photons at a rate of approximately
5000 pairs=s with a heralding efficiency of about 16%
(before losses accrued in optical gates), and fourfold
coincidences of 0.5 quads=s. Our detectors are a combi-
nation of Perkin-Elmer (now Excelitas) SPCM-AQRH-W2
and SPCM-AQ4C modules coupled to home-built coinci-
dence logic configured to operate with a coincidence
window of 4 ns.
The classical FHE that we have selected for encrypting
all classical bits is the “Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan”
scheme [22] as implemented in the HElib library [25],
lightly modified for easy integration with the experiment.
The library was called with a plaintext base p ¼ 2, security
parameter k ¼ 80, and number of plaintext slots l ¼ 150.
Briefly, these parameters specify the encoding used by
HElib and the corresponding size and structure of the
resulting ciphertext. While a detailed description of these
is beyond the scope of this paper, we refer the interested
reader to Ref. [30].
A core experimental goal in this paper is to demonstrate
that our QFHE implementation does indeed allow Bob to
perform an arbitrary computation on ciphertext jψi
securely, faithfully, and without assistance from Alice
(the latter being a key differentiator between our QFHE
scheme and previous SDQC protocols). Recall from Sec. II
B that this is enabled by encrypting plaintext jϕi with
randomized Pauli operators, along with the following
differences from previous experimentally demonstrated
protocols.
(1) Pauli encryption keys are themselves encrypted with
a classical FHE scheme.
(2) Ancillary qubits necessary for the evaluation of T
gates encode those Pauli encryption keys in a way
that allows Alice to prepare them at the same time as
jψi, independently of Bob’s chosen gates.
Since by now, the encrypt-compute-decrypt process is
well established for Clifford gates under this Pauli mixing
approach to hiding qubits (e.g., in Ref. [14]), we shall not
revisit this experimentally. Instead, we focus on our
implementation’s handling of T gates and, by extension,
point 2 here. We show that the front-loaded preparation of
ancilla qubits and their use during computation in a
noninteractive way as described in Sec. II B yields the
correct final results, even while jψi remains securely
encrypted. Of note, point 2 here is particularly salient
experimentally speaking, since the apparatus with which
Bob performs a T-gate evaluation on jψi with the requisite
phase correction is at times complex, requiring the imple-
mentation of a more specialized and efficient two-photon
gate (see Sec. III A).
While implementing point 1 is experimentally straight-
forward (requiring only some additional code to be
integrated with our control software), they are nevertheless
crucial parts of our QFHE scheme. To highlight their
importance, we concocted a toy two-party secure compu-
tation task that is easily solved with our QFHE scheme
thanks to point 1 and experimentally demonstrated it
in Sec. IV.
A. Fusion gate for adding phases
We digress briefly to describe the “phase-add gate” (also
known as a “type-I fusion gate” [31]). It is a two-photon
optical gate based on bosonic bunching and acting on the
polarization d.o.f. that is central in our QFHE implemen-
tation. This optical gate, while less general, boasts a higher
postselection success probability than the standard alter-
natives. In Appendix B, we show experimental data testing
its operation.
Consider two photons, indistinguishable but for polari-
zation, interfering at a beam splitter. If that beam splitter is
carefully designed so fully transmit horizontal polarized
photons (TH ¼ 1,RH ¼ 0) while partially reflecting vertical
polarized photons (TH ¼ 1=3, RH ¼ 2=3), one can easily
show that the effective operation in the polarization basis
upon postselection on coincidence (i.e., one photon in each
output port) is a controlled-Z gate [28]. In Fig. 6 we refer to
such an optical element as a partially polarizing beam splitter
(PPBS). Along with Hadamard orH gates (which are easily
realized with birefringent optics like a half-wave plate), this
is a standard approach to implement the CNOT operation
between polarization qubits encoded in two photons. Note
that this gate works only 1=9 of the time.
For our purposes, however, a general CNOT is not
necessary. As an example, in case 3 of Fig. 2, the CNOT
between ancillas merely serves as a means of accomplish-
ing phase addition (modulo π) between jξbi and jξai. That
is, we want a channel such that ðj0i þ eiϕa j1iÞa ⊗ ðj0iþ
eiϕb j1iÞb → ðj0i þ eiðϕaþϕbÞj1iÞa.
FIG. 7. Schematic of our double-pass SPDC source. The pump
(blue) is retroreflected to make a second pass through the BBO
crystal.
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Leveraging the fact that our ancillas are confined to
states on the equator of the Bloch sphere, we can be more
efficient by replacing the PPBS with a fully polarizing
beam splitter (PBS), i.e., TV ¼ 0, RV ¼ 1. Consider the
mode transformation of the PBS followed by an H gate on
one output arm, acting on ancilla states j0i þ eiϕa j1i and
j0i þ eiϕb j1i (in our convention, a photon in H or V
polarization encodes j0i or j1i, respectively):
1
2
ðaˆ†H þ eiϕa aˆ†VÞðbˆ†H þ eiϕb bˆ†VÞ
→
1
2
ffiffiffi
2
p aˆ†Hðbˆ†H þ bˆ†VÞ −
eiðϕaþϕbÞ
2
ffiffiffi
2
p aˆ†Vðbˆ†H − bˆ†VÞ; ð6Þ
where aˆ† and bˆ† are bosonic creation operators in the two
input or output modes of the PBS. Subscripts on these
operators label polarization. The H gate following the PBS
acts on mode b. In the last line, we have omitted terms that
do not contribute to simultaneous detection events between
modes a and b. Finally, we postselect on a coincident
detection event in the two spatial modes. When the photon
in mode b is in H (or V)—i.e., j0i (or j1i)—the photon in
mode a is left in state jξ0i:
if bˆ†V j0i; then jξ0i ¼
1ffiffiffi
2
p ðj0i þ eiðϕaþϕbÞj1iÞ;
if bˆ†Hj0i; then jξ0i ¼
1ffiffiffi
2
p ðj0i − eiðϕaþϕbÞj1iÞ: ð7Þ
When a V polarized photon is found in mode b, jξ0i is
exactly the qubit state that we expect when classical bit
m1 ¼ 0 on the middle rail in case 3 of Fig. 2. If on the other
hand an H polarized photon is found in mode b, jξ0i does
not quite correspond to the m1 ¼ 1 case in Fig. 2. But it
nevertheless carries the correct phase modulo π. We can
therefore choose to either implement a feed-forward
correction (for example, by electronically triggering a
Pauli Z in mode a upon the detection of an H photon in
mode b), or we may simply modify the key transformation
rule indicated in Fig. 2 to read
a00 ¼ r ⊕ s ⊕ aðb ⊕ 1Þ ⊕ ða ⊕ bÞm2 ⊕ m1; ð8Þ
where we now define m1 ¼ 0 when postselection on bˆ†V
succeeds and m1 ¼ 1 when bˆ†H succeeds.
Note that the success probability for postselection of
each polarization on the b mode photon is 1=4, so that the
total probability of successful operation of the optical gate
is 1=2. This is far more efficient than 1=9 for the standard
alternative, e.g., a general purpose CNOT.
B. Setup and methodology
Our QFHE scheme was implemented for one data qubit,
two ancillary qubits, and a lone T gate—the smallest
nontrivial system that is instructive to implement. The
main novel aspect of our QFHE implementation that is
worthwhile to test and highlight experimentally is the way
in which it accommodates T gates in a noninteractive way.
As previously discussed (Sec. II B), in our setting of an
arbitrary sequence of single-qubit Clifford gates followed
by one T gate, the Pauli X decryption key b0 can branch into
just three distinct values, each of which requires a different
phase correction and a different use of the ancillary qubits.
Therefore, rather than testing all possible single-qubit
Clifford sequences, it is sufficient to probe our QFHE
implementation with just three canonical examples, one for
each branch of the Pauli X decryption key. The three
examples are enumerated in Fig. 2 and they correspond to
Bob acting on jψi to effect the computations: Tjϕi, THjϕi,
and THPjϕi, respectively. While longer Clifford sequences
may precede the T gate, the manner in which ancillary
qubits and therefore two-qubit or two-photon gates are
used—by far the greatest source of errors and losses in our
QFHE implementation—does not vary from these three
canonical examples. With the optical apparatus shown in
Fig. 6 we implemented the circuits in Fig. 2. We now
briefly describe that apparatus.
Alice prepares and encrypts her data qubit in the photon
on the top left rail. She also prepares two ancillas, jξai and
jξbi, encoded in photons on the two bottommost rails.
When implementing cases 1 and 2 (i.e., when Bob
evaluates Tjϕi or THjϕi), the phase-add gate is not
required, so we swap the appropriate ancilla up into the
second rail, where it is then allowed to interact with the
ciphertext qubit at “CNOT 1”. When implementing case 3
(i.e., when Bob evaluates THPjϕi), phases on both ancillas
are first summed at the phase-add gate (see Sec. III A).
Meanwhile, the ciphertext qubit is allowed to bypass
CNOT 1 (relevant optical components are moved out of
that photon’s path). The ciphertext qubit that began as the
top left photon now propagates directly to “CNOT 2,” where
it is entangled with the remaining ancilla (the other now
serves as a herald for successful operation of the phase-add
gate). All (classical) bits resulting from measurement that
Bob performs while evaluating Tjϕi, THjϕi, or THPjϕi
are sent back to Alice in order that she be able to perform
decryption correctly.
Note that the setup is noninteractive. Throughout the
computation, Bob has all the resources he needs and his
only interactions with Alice are limited to receiving or
returning ciphertext jψi and ancillary resources at the start
or end of his computation. In turn, at no point does Alice
need to be informed about Bob’s choice of computation in
order to faithfully decrypt jψi. This is what sets our scheme
apart from earlier SDQC schemes.
To verify that the protocol works as advertised, Alice
prepares and sends a variety of plaintext states to Bob as
inputs to his operation(s). She decrypts and measures states
that Bob returns in a variety of bases so as to be able to
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tomographically infer the effective process map for his
computaiton or evaluation. If indeed the protocol is correct,
Alice’s tomographic reconstruction of Bob’s process
should closely match the ideal T, TH, or THP unitary
operators.
We further repeat the experiment, this time with Alice’s
secret keys purged and replaced with a set of erroneous
keys. In this case, we expect the tomographically recon-
structed process to be the completely depolarizing channel
instead. Decryption (Dec) with erroneous keys is accom-
plished by asking HElib to generate two sets of keys, sk1
and sk2, and programming Alice to compute Decsk2
½Encsk1ða; b; r; sÞ, thereby simulating what an attacker
with no access to the correct key sk1 might observe.
C. Data and results
Figures 8–10 show plots of how pure states spanning
the surface of a Bloch sphere transform under the unitaries
T, TH, and THP, respectively (canonical single-qubit
cases enumerated in Fig. 2). Figures 8(a), 9(a), and
10(a) represent every possible (pure) plaintext state by a
unique color. For example, white or black at the poles
represents the initial plaintext input state j0i or j1i whereas
saturated bright red or yellow along the equator represents
input plaintext states jþi or j0i þ eiπ=3j1i, respectively.
Figures 8(b), 9(b), and 9(b) show how these input plaintext
states transformunder an idealT,TH, orTHP gate sequence.
For example, an idealT operation corresponds to a rotationby
π=4 about the Sz axis on the Bloch sphere, a fact that can be
clearly seen by comparing Figs. 8(a) and 8(b).
Figures 8(c), 9(c), and 10(c) show the corresponding
experimentally realized transformations, performed by
Bob, when Alice correctly decrypts the output state.
These should ideally closely resemble Figs. 8(b), 9(b),
and 10(b). Finally, Figs. 8(d), 9(d), and 10(d) show tomo-
graphic reconstructions of the effective transformation
when decryption is not done properly. Without decryption,
the output state should resemble the maximally mixed state
(represented as a point with coordinates Sx¼Sy¼Sz¼0 in
the middle of the Bloch sphere) regardless of Alice’s input
plaintext state and Bob’s operation(s).
The effective process maps used in the bottom row of
Figs. 8–10 were inferred through process tomography on
experimental data (after decoding by Alice) using standard
maximum likelihood estimation [32]. In both cases, an
overcomplete set of preparations fj0i; j1i; jþi; j−i; j þ ii;
j − iig and measurements fσx; σy; σzg was used. For each
preparation and measurement configuration, ∼450 shots
were accumulated for the T and TH cases, and approx-
imately ∼100 shots for the THP case. The significantly
lower average photon count per configuration in the latter
case is a consequence of the reduced postselection success
probability from having to perform two two-qubit
gates. More precisely, the operation of the phase-add gate
FIG. 8. Tomographic reconstruction of T unitary operator.
From top left to bottom right: (a) initial Bloch sphere of pure
states, (b) simulation of that Bloch sphere under ideal T,
(c) experimental reconstruction with correct decryption, and
(d) experimental reconstruction with bad decryption.
FIG. 9. Tomographic reconstruction of TH unitary operator.
From top left to bottom right: (a) initial Bloch sphere of pure
states, (b) simulation of that Bloch sphere under ideal TH,
(c) experimental reconstruction with correct decryption, and
(d) experimental reconstruction with bad decryption.
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(shown in Fig. 6 and described in Sec. III A) places an
additional postselection penalty that is compounded with
the general CNOT gate(s) (that are also postselective). In our
implementation of the phase-add gate, that additional
postselection has a success rate of 25% since we post-
selected only on one polarization (labeled b†V in Sec. III A).
Equally important is the fact that whereas in the T and TH
cases correct operation of a single CNOT gate is heralded by
a pairwise coincidence event (detection of one boson per
mode, over two modes), in the THP case correct operation
of two two-qubit gates is heralded by quadruple (double
pair) coincidence events—a much rarer occurrence.
In the interest of thoroughness, we have also presented the
same data in bar chart in Figs. 12–14. Those figures show
the magnitude of elements of the process matrix. In the
Kraus representation of a qubit map, ρout ¼
P
j KjρinK
†
j ,
the matrix Mjk ¼ χjk þ iξjk succinctly defines Kraus
operators Ki in terms of a standard Pauli basis: Kj ¼P
k ðχjk þ iξjkÞσk. Here, χ; ξ ∈ R and σk is to be interpreted
as a Pauli matrix with the following labeling: σ0 ¼ I,
σ1 ¼ X, σ2 ¼ Y, and σ3 ¼ Z. The top row of Figs. 12–14
shows matrix elements for correctly decrypted qubits,
whereas the bottom row of Figs. 12–14 shows the corre-
sponding encrypted one (ideally, the maximally mixed
state). Blue bars in all panels indicate matrix elements in
the ideal case, whereas yellow bars show the corresponding
experimental reconstructions.
Together, Figs. 8–10 allow us to evaluate our proof of
concept along two aforementioned metrics: the protocol
produces correct decrypted states and the encrypted states
remain securely hidden. By comparing the ideal and
experimental process maps in panels (b) and (c) of these
figures, we can check that the encryption protocol allows
Bob to perform the correct unitary operation(s) on Alice’s
encrypted state. Calculating an average process fidelity
allows us to perform a compact quantitative comparison
[33]. Here the average process fidelities between Bob’s
FIG. 10. Tomographic reconstruction of THP unitary operator.
From top left to bottom right: (a) initial Bloch sphere of pure
states, (b) simulation of that Bloch sphere under ideal THP,
(c) experimental reconstruction with correct decryption, and
(d) experimental reconstruction with bad decryption.
FIG. 11. Background compensated version of Fig. 10.
FIG. 12. Tomographic reconstruction of T unitary operator.
From top left to bottom right: (a),(b) real and imaginary parts of
process matrix, given correct decryption, and (c),(d) real and
imaginary parts of process matrix, given wrong decryption.
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operations, realized experimentally via the QFHE protocol,
and the desired ideal T, TH, and THP unitaries are 96.1%,
96.2%, and 83%, respectively. Noting that experimental
imperfections (discussed below) make it difficult if not
impossible to achieve a perfect 100% fidelity, these rela-
tively high (significantly greater than 50%) fidelities give us
confidence as to the correctness of the QFHE scheme.
On security, recall that absent proper decryption, the
Pauli mixing encryption step should behave like the fully
depolarizing channel, which noninvertibly maps all input
plaintext to the maximally mixed state. We can check that
our encrypted states (or erroneously decrypted ones) do not
leak information about the corresponding plaintext states
by comparing Figs. 8(d), 9(d), and 10(d) (effective process
maps for improperly decrypted states) to Figs. 8(b), 9(b),
and 10(b) (ideal desired unitaries), as well as to an ideal
depolarizing channel. In our implementation, the effective
process on encrypted states [Figs. 8(d), 9(d), and 10(d)]
exhibits average process fidelities with the ideal T, TH, and
THP operations [Figs. 8(b), 9(b), and 10(b)] of 51.7%,
47.4%, and 50.2%, respectively. For reference, the process
fidelity between the fully depolarizing channel and any ideal
unitary is 50%. Furthermore, the processes in Figs. 8(d),
9(d), and 10(d) have average process fidelities with respect
to the ideal depolarizing channel of 99.8%, 99.7%, and
99.4%, respectively. The fact that the an improperly
decrypted state appears very much like the maximally
mixed state gives us confidence that an eavesdropper
intercepting encrypted qubits from our implementation
can deduce little information about Alice’s plaintext state.
D. Experimental errors
Note that our experimentally reconstructed processes in
the case of properly decrypted states [Figs. 8(c), 9(c), and
10(c)] are not perfect unitary maps—they map pure states
to somewhat mixed states (i.e., they shrink the Bloch
sphere). Since all qubits in our implementation are encoded
in the photon polarization d.o.f., single-qubit unitary
operations are realized through the use of standard bire-
fringent retarders like half- and quarter-wave plates with
extremely high fidelities. The primary limiting factor for
our experimental process fidelities therefore is the quality
of our two-qubit gates (i.e., the CNOT and phase-add gates).
The dominant source of error in these two-qubit gates, in
turn, is imperfect two-photon interference. Recall that these
optical two-qubit gates yield the desired process only when
second-order interference between two single-mode
bosonic creation operators occurs at a beam splitter and
is followed by postselection on exactly one boson in each
output mode. Imperfect interference implies that even when
the postselection is done correctly, pathological terms can
persist in the resulting state. Practical limitations in con-
struction of our apparatus (e.g., imperfect alignment of
collection modes, defects in collection optics, and variances
in spectral profile of narrow band filters) contribute to finite
interference contrasts. Furthermore, photons from different
SPDC events (“interpair” photons) may not have the same
(coherent) spectral correlations that exist between photons
from the same SPDC event (“intrapair” ones), thereby
partially invalidating the single-mode assumption which
further reduces visibility in the latter case.
In our apparatus, intrapair photons exhibited HOM
interference contrast of 97.0 0.5% at a 50=50 BS
(∼77% at a PPBS, where 80% is expected). Interpair
photons, on the other hand, had a HOM contrast of 90.0
1.5% (∼72% at a PPBS). In the case of the THP unitary
operator, the issue is further compounded by the need to
perform two consecutive two-qubit gates—in Fig. 6 these
are labeled as the “phase-add” and “CNOT 2” gates, the
latter operating by HOM interference between photons
FIG. 13. Tomographic reconstruction of TH unitary operator.
From top left to bottom right: (a),(b) real and imaginary parts of
process matrix, given correct decryption, and (c),(d) real and
imaginary parts of process matrix, given wrong decryption.
FIG. 14. Tomographic reconstruction of THP unitary operator.
From top left to bottom right: (a),(b) real and imaginary parts of
process matrix, given correct decryption, and (c),(d) real and
imaginary parts of process matrix, given wrong decryption.
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from different SPDC events. This explains the relatively
lower fidelity of our realization of the THP unitary
compared to T and TH.
A less obvious but equally important effect is the
contribution of parasitic processes that leads to unwanted
coincidence events, effectively producing false positives on
one-boson-per-mode postselection. For instance, higher-
order SPDC events that yield more than one photon per
output mode can contribute to successful postselection (i.e.,
coincidence) events that do not yield the desired output
states. Similarly, because our coincidence windows while
small are nevertheless finite, two uncorrelated photons or
detector noise can nevertheless register erroneously but
positively on our coincidence circuit.
Practical limitations imposed by equipment or pro-
cedural imperfections cannot be remedied easily. And
while background processes due to higher-order SPDC
events can be mitigated by reducing pump power, doing
so results in impractically small signals. However, since
our apparatus is sufficiently well characterized, we can
calculate the expected prevalence of background processes
described above and subtract them from our signal in post-
processing. A background-subtracted version of Fig. 10,
which plots experimental data for the THP unitary oper-
ator, is shown in Fig. 11. With background subtraction,
process fidelity for the tomographic reconstruction of the
THP unitary operator with correct decryption increases
from 83% to 94%.
IV. APPLICATION OF QFHE: TWO-PARTY
SECURE COMPUTATION
A. Protocol description
In this section, we describe a protocol we developed in
order to demonstrate a use case for QFHE that is otherwise
difficult to accomplish. Imagine Alice and Bob each
possess a qubit state, ρα and ρβ, respectively. They are
tasked with comparing their states, for instance, by com-
puting the following distance measure:
Dαβ ¼ Trðρ1=2β ραρ1=2β Þ: ð9Þ
Note that this expression is very reminiscent of the fidelity
[24], Fðρα; ρβÞ, albeit with squared summands in the trace.
In the pure state limit, Dαβ reduces to F2ðρα; ρβÞ.
Now Alice and Bob wish to compute Dαβ without
sharing any more information about their qubit state than
strictly necessary. In other words, neither can be allowed to
tomographically reconstruct the other’s state. Here we
describe a protocol that accomplishes this in the
“honest-but-curious” setting—i.e., we merely seek to
secure data from curious prying eyes, but we assume that
Alice and Bob are honest at carrying out their respective
parts in the protocol, so no attempt is made at verifying the
computation to guard against either party intentionally
producing erroneous results.
A simple solution to learning Dαβ is the comparator
circuit shown in Fig. 15(a). It is easy to show (see
Appendix A) that under this circuit, the projector Π1;1 ¼
j1ih1j ⊗ j1ih1j has an expectation value that directly yields
the infidelity hΠ1;1i ¼ 12 ð1 −DαβÞ. Note that this yields the
same statistics as the SWAP test. But we eschew the SWAP
test in favor of our comparator circuit so as to obviate
the need for a Fredkin (controlled-SWAP) gate that is
difficult to implement experimentally. We build our pro-
tocol on our simple comparator circuit with the following
slight additions.
Invoking our QFHE scheme, Alice encrypts all N
copies of her qubit by preparing σð1Þα ⊗    ⊗ σðNÞα ¼
Za⃗Xb⃗ρ⊗Nα Xb⃗Za⃗ and sends them all at once to Bob along
with classically homomorphically encrypted keys Encða⃗Þ
and Encðb⃗Þ. As before, a⃗; b⃗ ∈ f0; 1g⊗N and Xa⃗ is to be
interpreted as Xa1 ⊗    ⊗ XaN . Bob in turn performs the
comparator circuit between each of Alice’s qubit σðiÞα and a
copy of his own ρβ. Figure 15(b) illustrates this. Upon
measuring the ith pair of qubits, Bob homomorphically
adds classical outcomes kðiÞ1 and k
ðiÞ
2 to Alice’s encrypted
keys to obtain Encðai ⊕ kðiÞ1 Þ and Encðbi ⊕ kðiÞ2 Þ. Referring
to key transformation rules in Fig. 1, observe that upon
decryption one can compute
hΠ1;1i ¼
1
N
X
i
fðai ⊕ kðiÞ1 Þ × ðbi ⊕ kðiÞ2 Þg; ð10Þ
where addition in the summands are modulo 2, while top-
level summation is on the full set of integers.
An additional crucial step in this protocol is for Bob to
scramble the order of these classical per-shot results before
returning them to Alice:
FIG. 15. (a) A simple comparator circuit. (b) A secure com-
parator that uses our QFHE scheme. Here, σðiÞα is the ith encrypted
copy of Alice’s qubit, ρβ is Bob’s qubit, and k
ðiÞ
1 ; k
ðiÞ
2 ∈ f0; 1g are
classical measurement outcomes.
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Encðai ⊕ kðiÞ1 Þ → Encðasi þ kðsiÞ1 Þ;
Encðbi ⊕ kðiÞ2 Þ → Encðbsi þ kðsiÞ2 Þ; ð11Þ
where si is the i-th element in a random permutation on the
set f1;…; Ng. This is important in order to ensure the
security of Bob’s qubit which, unlike Alice’s qubit, is not
encrypted. Absent this scrambling, Alice can prepare and
keep track of the inner product between Bob’s qubit and a
variety of states of her choosing, thereby effectively doing
tomography on Bob’s state. We stress that Alice can
compute the correct Dαβ despite this scrambling by Bob
precisely because in our QFHE scheme, Bob has access to—
and can manipulate as part of his evaluation key—Alice’s
(classically homomorphically encrypted) Pauli keys.
B. Experimental demonstration
We implement this protocol by using a subset of our full
setup, with minimal modifications. Figure 16 illustrates
this. Computer-controlled wave plates representing Alice
and Bob were programmed to randomly select and prepare
qubits from a predefined set of logical or plaintext states
(determined by range and precision of motion of our
motorized actuators). In Alice’s case, these wave plate
settings take into account randomly generated one-time
pads. The infidelity between Alice’s and Bob’s states is
then measured as described above and plotted against its
actual value in Fig. 17. As we have done in previous
sections, we also ran the protocol for the same set of logical
input states but with an intentionally erroneous decryption
key. The result is shown in Fig. 18. The median number of
photons or qubits represented by each point in these plots
is ∼960.
Observe in Fig. 17 that in the case of correct decryption,
2hΠ1;1i shows good agreement with theoretically expected
values (dashed line), indicating the protocol indeed allows
Alice to retrieve the infidelity between her state and Bob’s.
By comparison, in Fig. 18 where decryption is done
incorrectly, 2hΠ1;1i hovers near a constant 0.5 (i.e., the
infidelity with respect to the maximally mixed state),
suggesting that anyone without the secret key gains no
information about that infidelity.
V. DISCUSSION
In Sec. III we presented data that showed the QFHE
scheme in operation. With proper decryption, Bob was able
FIG. 16. Experimental setup for our secure comparator two-
party protocol.
FIG. 17. Plot of measured versus actual infidelity between two
states, given correct decryption. Dashed line indicates expected
theoretical values.
FIG. 18. Plot of measured versus actual infidelity between two
states, given wrong decryption. Dashed line indicates expected
theoretical values—decrypting with an erroneous key should
yield 0.5 (i.e., infidelity relative to the maximally mixed state).
Good agreement with this dashed line indicates that result of the
computation is well hidden from parties without a valid decryp-
tion key.
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to faithfully effect the intended operation with fidelities
routinely in excess of 90% (or 80% without background
subtraction when said operation is the unitary THP). As
discussed in Sec. III D, the main limiting factor was
imperfect visibility in two-qubit gates that manifested as
dephasing in the decrypted qubit.
Note that the encrypted (or improperly decrypted) qubits
returned by Bob, while close, are not exactly the maximally
mixed state (lower panels in Figs. 8–10); in Sec. III C, we
reported fidelities with respect to the ideal maximally
mixed state in excess of 99%. There are two main
contributing factors: measurement shot noise and sampling
noise in generating encryption key(s). With a limited key
length and number of measurement shots, one’s estimates
of the expectation values of various measurement operators
(in our case hσxi, hσyi, and hσzi) may be imperfect even
when the underlying state is the perfectly depolarized or
maximally mixed state. We wish to impress upon the reader
that this does not immediately imply that Alice’s plaintext
is being leaked—in the sameway that unequal heads versus
tails in a small number of coin tosses does not imply an
unfair coin. We calculated that the results we presented in
Sec. III were consistent with the ciphertext (or an incor-
rectly decrypted one) being the maximally mixed state, to
within tolerances set by shot or sampling noise in each
dataset (for example, see error bars in the bottom panels of
Figs. 12–14).
While we are confident that our implementation “works
as advertised” within its design constraints (as a demon-
stration of our QFHE protocol), the question of security
when it is used outside of those constraints and potentially
subjected to abuse is a more complicated one. To start, all
three of our optical two-qubit gates operate via postselec-
tions that do not always succeed. This, along with practical
experimental losses, means that many photons sharing the
same polarization may fail to register on our detectors and
can be surreptitiously siphoned off by an attacker. Now
whereas a Pauli one-time-padded state (with keys changed
on a per-shot basis) appears to an eavesdropper as max-
imally mixed, a string of many photons all encrypted with
the same Pauli keys can be used to infer a pure state (e.g.,
via state tomography) that is precisely the plaintext qubit
1=4 of the time.
For an N-qubit state this means that the correct plaintext
is one of Oð4NÞ possible pure states thus inferred. This is
very much analogous to a classical one-time-padded bit
string, where the plaintext is one of 2N possible bit strings.
And yet, even if an adversary siphoning many copies of
identically prepared ciphertext is unlikely to deduce the
corresponding plaintext, they nevertheless gain information
about the (unique) eigenbasis of the ciphertext—which
would not be possible if each shot is independently keyed,
since the maximally mixed state has infinitely many,
equally valid eigenbases. In some cases, this can be
undesirable. As an example, with jξi the ancillary states
in our protocol, it is precisely the eigenbasis in which jξi is
prepared that encodes Alice’s Pauli X key. Note that this is
directly analogous to the vulnerability of quantum key
distribution in some implementations with nonsingle-
photon (e.g., weak coherent state) sources [34–37].
In our implementation, we modulated the key refresh
rate and detector count time such that the average number
of (coincident) detection events per key setting after
experimental losses is ⪅ 1. Despite this, noncoincident
detection events [e.g., from an “orphaned” SPDC photon
whose partner was lost, or events in which our two-photon
gate postselection(s) failed] are significantly greater than 1,
so our apparatus remains vulnerable to the sort of attack just
described. However, we note that this can be mitigated in
part by using hardware that enables higher key switching
rates (for example, by switching out mechanical motors in
our case with, say, Pockels cells) or, indeed, by using on-
demand photon sources. We also remind the reader that
while postselective two-qubit gates are adequate for small-
scale proofs of concept like ours, future implementations
can simultaneously be made efficient and more secure by
turning to deterministic optical architectures [38–41] or
other physical platforms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we constructed, implemented, and dem-
onstrated a fully homomorphic encryption scheme for
universal gate-based quantum computers first proposed
in Ref. [18] and extended in Ref. [19]. With this scheme,
any party in possession of encrypted qubits may evaluate a
quantum circuit of their choice. This is accomplished with
the aid of ancillas and classical bits prepared at the time of
encryption and transmitted along with the ciphertext.
Multiple use of a communication channel, quantum or
classical, is not required. Explicit knowledge of the circuit
(s) evaluated is not necessary for correct decryption.
Furthermore, we make no concessions on security apart
from assumptions that underlie the classical homomorphic
cryptosystem that we use to construct our scheme.
Previously demonstrated schemes compromise on one or
more of these attributes.
We also solve the simple task of computing the inner
product of two single-qubit states securely, that is, without
allowing either party to tomographically characterize the
other’s qubit. Our encryption scheme provides for an
elegant solution to this task, which is otherwise difficult
to accomplish.
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APPENDIX A: INFIDELITY MEASURE FROM A
SIMPLE COMPARATOR CIRCUIT
The CNOT gatewith control in the first register and target in
the second is defined asCNOT ¼ j0ih0j ⊗ I þ j1ih1j ⊗ σX,
where σX is the Pauli X operator. The result of its action on a
pair of qubits is
CNOTðρα ⊗ ρβÞCNOT†
¼ ρð00Þα j0ih0j ⊗ ρβ þ ρð11Þα j1ih1j ⊗ σXρβσX
þ ρð01Þα j0ih1j ⊗ ρβσX þ ρð10Þα j1ih0j ⊗ σXρβ;
where ρðijÞ ¼ hijρjji denotes the (i, j)-th entry of a given
densitymatrix.We subsequently act on the first registerwith a
Hadamard, i.e., with H⊗I¼ðjþih0jþj−ih1jÞ⊗I, where
ji ¼ ðj0i  j1iÞ= ffiffiffi2p .
Of the large number of terms that result, we focus only
on those that contribute to TrðρoutΠ1;1Þ, where Π1;1 ¼
j1ih1j ⊗ j1ih1j. Keeping in mind that the Pauli X operator
simply permutes rows (columns) of a qubit density matrix
when acting on it from the left (right), we have
TrðρoutΠ1;1Þ ¼ Tr

Π1;1
j1ih1jffiffiffi
2
p H ⊗ ðρð01Þα ρβσX − ρð11Þα σXρβσXÞ þ
j1ih0jffiffiffi
2
p H ⊗ ðρð00Þα ρβ − ρð10Þα σXρβÞ

¼ 1
2
TrðΠ1;1fj1ih1j ⊗ ðρð00Þα ρβ − ρð10Þα σXρβ − ρð01Þα ρβσX þ ρð11Þα σXρβσXÞgÞ
¼ 1
2
ðρð00Þα ρð11Þβ − ρð10Þα ρð01Þβ − ρð01Þα ρð10Þβ þ ρð11Þα ρð00Þβ Þ
¼ 1
2
½1 − ðρð11Þα ρð11Þβ þ ρð00Þα ρð00Þβ þ ρð10Þα ρð01Þβ þ ρð01Þα ρð10Þβ Þ
¼ 1
2
½1 − TrðραρβÞ
¼ 1 −Dαβ
2
;
where in the penultimate line we have used the fact that ρα
and ρβ have unit trace so that ρ
ð00Þ
α ¼ 1 − ρð11Þα , for example.
Note also that if ρα ¼ jαihαj and ρβ ¼ jβihβj (i.e., they are
both pure), then
1 −Dαβ ¼ 1 − jhαjβij2:
APPENDIX B: PERFORMANCE
OF PHASE-ADD GATE
In order to characterize our phase-add gate, we first
prepared two photons, one in each of the two bottommost
rails in our experimental apparatus (Fig. 6 of main text), in
the state jþi ¼ ðjHi þ jViÞ= ffiffiffi2p with just the leftmost half-
and quarter-wave plates. The liquid-crystal wave plate
(LCWP) on one rail was fixed to π retardance so that the
photon on that rail is left in j−i. The other LCWP was
configured to scan its retardance (ϕ) from 0 through 3π=2
(we used Meadowlark variable retarder units with home-
built computer-controlled driving electronics). After a
Hong-Ou-Mandel interaction at the polarizing beam-splitter
(inside dashed box labeled “phase-add gate” in Fig. 6), the
photon on the bottommost rail was projected onto jþihþj
andwe postselected for coincident detection events between
the two rails. As discussed in Sec. III A, the other photon
must be found in the state ðjHi þ eiϕjViÞ= ffiffiffi2p . Over
multiple shots (approximately 1000 each), we measured
the remaining photon along an informationally overcom-
plete set of bases (i.e., by projecting onto D=A, H=V, and
L=Rpolarizations) in order to tomographically infer its state.
Figure 19 shows the Bloch vector components of this
inferred state as a function of ϕ (LCWP retardance). The
sinusoidal oscillation of Sx and Sy (with a π phase shift) is
indicative of the phases between the two photons being
added in the output photon. In the absence of a HOM
interaction, the phase-add gate behaves simply as a PBS
(transmitting H and reflecting V polarization), that is
insensitive to phases written onto either photon (like ϕ).
We tested this regime by introducing a path delay between
the two photons much greater than their pulse widths
(≈5 mm=c≫ 150 fs), in which case Sx ¼ Sy ¼ Sz ¼ 0
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regardless of LCWP retardance (not shown here). Finally,
we also checked that the phase-add gate operates symmet-
rically with respect to both input photons. We configured
both LCWPs to write phases (say, ϕ and φ) onto both
photons and checked that the output polarization is indeed
ðjHi þ eiðϕþφÞjViÞ= ffiffiffi2p to within error tolerances.
APPENDIX C: CNOTS, TELEPORTATION,
AND PHASE-ADD CIRCUITS
In this Appendix, we explain the operation of the circuits
in Figs. 3 and 4.
Consider the states
jψi ¼ αj0i þ βj1i;
jξi ¼ ZrPbjþi
¼ 1ffiffiffi
2
p ðj0i þ eiθj1iÞ;
where θ ¼ ð2rþ bÞπ=2.
The action of a CNOT gate controlled by jψi and targeting
jξi is
CNOT1→2ðjψi⊗ jξiÞ
¼ αj0i⊗ jξi>þβj1⊗ Xjξi
¼ αffiffiffi
2
p j0i⊗ ðj0i þ eiθj1iÞ þ βffiffiffi
2
p j1i⊗ ðj1i þ eiθj0iÞ
¼ ðαj0i þ eiθβj1iÞ⊗ j0iffiffiffi
2
p þ eiθðαj0i þ e−iθβj1iÞ⊗ j1iffiffiffi
2
p :
If the outcome from measuring the second register
(which we labeled m in Figs. 3 and 4) is 0, then the first
register is left in the state ðαj0i þ eiθβj1iÞ ¼ ZrPbjψi.
Otherwise (i.e., m ¼ 1), up to a global phase, the first
register is left in ðαj0i þ e−iθβj1iÞ ¼ ZrP†bjψi. Because
P†b ¼ ZbPb, we can write the final state of the first register
concisely as Zr⊕bmPbjψi.
In the special case where jψi ¼ ZsPajþi, a simple
substitution yields the phase-addition (modulo π) action
of Fig. 4,
Zr⊕bmPbjψi ¼ Zr⊕bm⊕sPaþbjþi ¼ ZqPa⊕bjþi;
where q ¼ r ⊕ bm ⊕ s ⊕ baþ b=2c.
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